

## Decizie de indexare a faptei de plagiat la poziția 00398 / 30.12.2017 și pentru admitere la publicare în volum tipărit

care se bazează pe:

**A. Nota de constatare și confirmare a indiciilor de plagiat prin fișa suspiciunii inclusă în decizie.**

Fișa suspiciunii de plagiat / Sheet of plagiarism's suspicion	
Opera suspicionată (OS) Suspicious work	Opera autentică (OA) Authentic work
OS	FREY, Carola. The parallelism between the theory of war and the theory of painting based on Clausewitz assumptions. <i>Proceedings the 10th International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI". Strategic changes in security and international relations. Unfolded under the aegis of 125 years from NDU "Carol I" foundation and 10 years from Romania's accession to NATO. Vol.2. April 10 - 11, 2014. Bucharest: National Defense University „Carol I”. pp.44-47. ISSN 2285-8415; ISSN-L 2285-8318</i> <b>Sursa suspiciunii / Source of suspicion:</b> 13 decembrie 2017 / <a href="http://www.nu-plagiatului.org">www.nu-plagiatului.org</a> .
OA	LTC Goh Teck Seng, Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy. <i>Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces</i> , Vol.25 No.1 (Jan - Mar 1999). Original URL: <a href="http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/6.htm">http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/6.htm</a>
Incidența minimă a suspiciunii / Minimum incidence of suspicion	
P01 <sup>1</sup>	p.46: 24 - p.47: 02s p.04: Endnote 15
Fișa întocmită pentru includerea suspiciunii în Indexul Operelor Plagiate în România de la Sheet drawn up for including the suspicion in the Index of Plagiarized Works in Romania at <a href="http://www.plagiate.ro">www.plagiate.ro</a>	

**Notă:** Prin „p.72:00” se înțelege paragraful care se termină la finele pag.72. Notăția „p.00:00” semnifică până la ultima pagină a capitolului curent, în întregime de la punctul inițial al preluării.

**Note:** By „p.72:00” one understands the text ending with the end of the page 72. By „p.00:00” one understands the taking over from the initial point till the last page of the current chapter, entirely.

**B. Fișa de argumentare a calificării de plagiat alăturată, fișă care la rândul său este parte a deciziei.**

Echipa Indexului Operelor Plagiate în România

<sup>1</sup> Pn este numărul piesei de creație care constituie obiectul preluării neconforme / is the number of the creative piece, object of the non-conforming takeover.

## Fișa de argumentare a calificării

Nr. crt.	Descrierea situației care este încadrată drept plagiat	Se confirmă
1.	Preluarea identică a unor pasaje (piese de creație de tip text) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără precizarea întinderii și menționarea provenienței și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	✓
2.	Preluarea a unor pasaje (piese de creație de tip text) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, care sunt rezumate ale unor opere anterioare operei autentice, fără precizarea întinderii și menționarea provenienței și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
3.	Preluarea identică a unor figuri (piese de creație de tip grafic) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără menționarea provenienței și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
4.	Preluarea identică a unor tabele (piese de creație de tip structură de informație) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără menționarea provenienței și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
5.	Republicarea unei opere anterioare publicate, prin includerea unui nou autor sau de noi autori fără contribuție explicită în lista de autori	
6.	Republicarea unei opere anterioare publicate, prin excluderea unui autor sau a unor autori din lista inițială de autori.	
7.	Preluarea identică de pasaje (piese de creație) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără precizarea întinderii și menționarea provenienței, fără nici o intervenție personală care să justifice exemplificarea sau critica prin aportul creator al autorului care preia și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	✓
8.	Preluarea identică de figuri sau reprezentări grafice (piese de creație de tip grafic) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără menționarea provenienței, fără nici o intervenție care să justifice exemplificarea sau critica prin aportul creator al autorului care preia și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
9.	Preluarea identică de tabele (piese de creație de tip structură de informație) dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără menționarea provenienței, fără nici o intervenție care să justifice exemplificarea sau critica prin aportul creator al autorului care preia și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
10.	Preluarea identică a unor fragmente de demonstrație sau de deducere a unor relații matematice care nu se justifică în regăsirea unei relații matematice finale necesare aplicării efective dintr-o operă autentică publicată, fără menționarea provenienței, fără nici o intervenție care să justifice exemplificarea sau critica prin aportul creator al autorului care preia și însușirea acestora într-o lucrare ulterioară celei autentice.	
11.	Preluarea identică a textului (piese de creație de tip text) unei lucrări publicate anterior sau simultan, cu același titlu sau cu titlu similar, de un același autor / un același grup de autori, în publicații sau edituri diferite.	
12.	Preluarea identică de pasaje (piese de creație de tip text) ale unui cuvânt înainte sau ale unei prefețe care se referă la două opere, diferite, publicate în două momente diferite de timp.	

### Notă:

a) Prin „proveniență” se înțelege informația din care se pot identifica cel puțin numele autorului / autorilor, titlul operei, anul apariției.

b) Plagiatul este definit prin textul legii<sup>2</sup>.

„...plagiul – expunerea într-o operă scrisă sau o comunicare orală, inclusiv în format electronic, a unor texte, idei, demonstrații, date, ipoteze, teorii, rezultate ori metode științifice extrase din opere scrise, inclusiv în format electronic, ale altor autori, fără a menționa acest lucru și fără a face trimitere la operele originale...”.

Tehnic, plagiatul are la bază conceptul de **piesă de creație** care<sup>3</sup>:

„...este un element de comunicare prezentat în formă scrisă, ca text, imagine sau combinat, care posedă un subiect, o organizare sau o construcție logică și de argumentare care presupune niște premise, un raționament și o concluzie. Piesa de creație presupune în mod necesar o formă de exprimare specifică unei persoane. Piesa de creație se poate asocia cu întreaga operă autentică sau cu o parte a acesteia...”

cu care se poate face identificarea operei plagiata sau suspicioate de plagiat<sup>4</sup>:

„...O operă de creație se găsește în poziția de operă plagiată sau operă suspicioată de plagiat în raport cu o altă operă considerată autentică dacă:

- Cele două opere tratează același subiect sau subiecte înrudite.
- Opera autentică a fost făcută publică anterior operei suspicioate.
- Cele două opere conțin piese de creație identificabile comune care posedă, fiecare în parte, un subiect și o formă de prezentare bine definită.
- Pentru piesele de creație comune, adică prezente în opera autentică și în opera suspicioată, nu există o menționare explicită a provenienței. Menționarea provenienței se face printr-o citare care permite identificarea piesei de creație preluate din opera autentică.
- Simpla menționare a titlului unei opere autentice într-un capitol de bibliografie sau similar acestuia fără delimitarea întinderii preluării nu este de natură să evite punerea în discuție a suspiciunii de plagiat.
- Piesele de creație preluate din opera autentică se utilizează la construcții realizate prin juxtapunere fără ca acestea să fie tratate de autorul operei suspicioate prin poziția sa explicită.
- În opera suspicioată se identifică un fir sau mai multe fire logice de argumentare și tratare care leagă aceleași premise cu aceleași concluzii ca în opera autentică...”

<sup>2</sup> Legea nr. 206/2004 privind buna conduită în cercetarea științifică, dezvoltarea tehnologică și inovare, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 505 din 4 iunie 2004

<sup>3</sup> ISOC, D. Ghid de acțiune împotriva plagiatului: bună-conduită, prevenire, combatere. Cluj-Napoca: Ecou Transilvan, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> ISOC, D. Prevenitor de plagiat. Cluj-Napoca: Ecou Transilvan, 2014.



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”  
SECURITY AND DEFENSE FACULTY DOCTORAL SCHOOL

# PROCEEDINGS

THE 10<sup>TH</sup> INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE  
“STRATEGIES XXI”

## STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Unfolded under the aegis of 125 years from NDU “Carol I”  
foundation and 10 years from Romania’s accession to NATO*

Volume 2

### Scientific Editors:

Brigadier General (ROU AF), Professor Gabriel-Florin MOISESCU, PhD  
Colonel Professor eng. Toma PLEȘANU, PhD  
Colonel Professor eng. Gelu ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

April 10 - 11, 2014  
Bucharest, Romania

# INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE STRATEGIES XXI

## National Defense University „CAROL I”

Bucharest, Romania, April 10-11, 2014

### SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:

Brigadier General (ROU AF), Professor Gabriel-Florin MOISESCU, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
General (ret.) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
Magistrate Lieutenant General Professor Erich CSITKOVITS, PhD (National Defense Academy, Austria)  
Colonel Professor Ing. Bohuslav PŘIKRYL, PhD (University of Defense, Czech Republic)  
Brigadier General (ret.) Professor Eng. Rudolf URBAN, PhD (University of Defense, Czech Republic)  
Professor Zdenek ZEMANEK, CSc, PhD (University of Defense, Czech Republic)  
Major General Associate Professor Boguslaw PACEK, PhD (National Defense University, Poland)  
Navy Captain (ret.) Associate Professor Piotr GAWLICZEK, PhD (National Defense University, Poland)  
Colonel Professor Tadeusz SZCZUREK, Ph.D. (Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland)  
Brigadier General Associate Professor Dipl. Eng. Boris ĎURKECH, PhD (Armed Forces Academy of GMRS, Slovakia)  
Major General Professor Vuruna MLADEN, PhD (Military Academy, Serbia)  
Brigadier General Professor Slaven ZDILAR, PhD (“Petar Zrinski” Defense Academy, Croatia)  
Colonel Professor Mojca PEŠEC, PhD (Command Staff School, Slovenia)  
Brigadier General Professor Meelis KIILI, PhD (Baltic Defense College, Estonia)  
Professor Augustin MEAHER, PhD (Baltic Defense College, Estonia)  
Professor András PATYI, PhD (National University for Civil Service, Hungary)  
Colonel Gabor BOLDIZSAR, PhD (National University for Civil Service, Hungary)  
Colonel Professor Laszlo KOVACS, PhD (National University for Civil Service, Hungary)  
Colonel-general (ret.) Professor Zoltan SZENES, PhD (National University for Civil Service, Hungary)  
Lieutenant Colonel Professor Christophe MIDAN, PhD (Military School, Paris, France)  
Professor Larry WATTS, PhD (USA)  
Professor Radu MIHALCEA, PhD (University of Illinois, Chicago, USA)  
Brigadier General Professor Mihai BĂDESCU, PhD (“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy, Bucharest, Romania)  
Colonel Associate Professor Nicolae IANCU, PhD (“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania)  
Major General (ret.) Professor Mihail VASILE-OZUNU, PhD (“Spiru Haret” University, Bucharest, Romania)  
Professor Adrian IVAN, PhD (“Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj Napoca, Romania)  
Professor George POEDE, PhD (“Al.I. Cuza” University, Iaşi, Romania)  
Colonel Professor Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD  
Colonel Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD  
Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, PhD  
Colonel Professor Sorin PÎNZARIU, PhD  
Colonel Professor ing. Toma PLEŞANU, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)

Colonel Associate Professor Constantin POPESCU, PhD  
Colonel Professor ing. Gelu ALEXANDRESCU, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
Lieutenant Colonel Professor Dorel BUŞE, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
Colonel Professor Dănuţ TURCU, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
Lieutenant Colonel Associate Professor Daniel GHIBA, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)  
Colonel Associate Professor Lucian POPESCU, PhD (National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania)

### ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:

Colonel Professor Ioan DEAC, PhD  
Capitan (nv.) Professor Ioan CRĂCIUN, PhD  
Colonel Professor Constantin IORDACHE, PhD  
Colonel Associate Professor Mihail ANTON, PhD  
Colonel Associate Professor Sorin TOPOR, PhD  
Colonel Associate Professor Filofteia REPEZ, PhD  
Colonel Associate Professor Mirela PUŞCAŞU, PhD  
Colonel Associate Professor Ion CĂLIN, PhD  
Colonel Lecturer Dorin EPARU, PhD  
Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe STOIU, PhD  
Lieutenant Colonel Superior Instructor Cristian TEODORESCU, PhD student  
Navy Commander Superior Instructor Cătălin BURSUC, PhD student  
Major Superior Instructor Alexandru HERCIU, PhD student  
Professor Gheorghe BOARU, PhD  
Associate Professor Adriana RÎŞNOVEANU, PhD  
Associate Professor Elena ŞUŞNEA, PhD  
Associate Professor Mirela IONIŢĂ, PhD  
Scientific Researcher II Mihai Ştefan DINU, PhD  
Assistant Lecturer Doina ASAN, PhD  
Assistant Lecturer Corina ILIE, PhD  
Assistant Lecturer Veronica PĂSTAE, PhD student  
Assistant Lecturer Alina Mihaela STOICA, PhD student

### REVIEWING COMMITTEE:

Colonel Associate Professor Gheorghe DEACONU, PhD  
Lieutenant Colonel Lecturer Cosmin OLARIU, PhD student  
Major Lecturer Marius PĂUNESCU, PhD  
Major Superior Instructor Marius TOPOLNISKI, PhD student  
Associate Professor Margareta BOACĂ, PhD  
Associate Professor Sorina MARDAR, PhD  
Associate Professor Maria-Magdalena POPESCU, PhD  
Lecturer Ruxandra BULUC, PhD  
Lecturer Mihaela BUŞE, PhD  
Lecturer Luminiţa CRĂCIUN, PhD  
Lecturer Ecaterina HLIHOR, PhD  
Lecturer Luiza-Maria COSTEA, PhD  
Assistant Lecturer Polixenia OLAR, PhD student

### TECHNICAL COMMITTEE:

Colonel Lecturer Alexandru STOICA, PhD  
Laura Mihaela MÎNDRICAN  
Elena PLEŞANU

© The responsibility of the papers' content belongs entirely to their authors

ISSN 2285-8415

ISSN-L 2285-8318



## SPONSORS:

**Rohde & Schwarz** is an independent group of companies specialized in electronics. It is a leading supplier of solutions in the fields of:

- ⇒ test and measurement; broadcasting,
- ⇒ radiomonitoring and radiolocation,
- ⇒ as well as secure communications.

Established 80 years ago, **Rohde & Schwarz** has a global presence and a dedicated service network in over 70 countries. It has approx. 9300 employees and achieved a net revenue of € 1.9 billion (US\$ 2.5 billion) in fiscal year 2012/2013 (July 2012 to June 2013). Company headquarters are in Munich, Germany.

- It is one of the leading suppliers of professional HF, VHF and UHF, military and civil radio systems for use in stationary and mobile ground stations, on ships and airborne platforms.
- **Rohde & Schwarz** is a very well-known manufacturer of equipment and systems for detection, location and analysis of radio signals with applications in the following areas:
  - internal and external security, military and civil radio-monitoring,
  - as well as for EW systems.
- **Rohde & Schwarz SIT** subsidiary develops crypto products and systems necessary for:
  - the protection of information in modern data processing and communication systems,
  - as well as consulting and IT analysis for government authorities.

Since 2008, **Rohde & Schwarz** operates in Romania as ***Rohde & Schwarz Romania S.R.L.***, a company that replaces Rohde and Schwarz Representation Office and Rohde & Schwarz Romania Services S.R.L.

With a history of over 30 years on the Romanian market, Rohde & Schwarz decided to change its market approach to respond efficiently to customers' requests in Romania.

***Rohde & Schwarz Romania S.R.L.*** offers to its partners also calibration services, maintenance, repairing for the respective equipment and services and additional services such as: system integration, installation, specialized software applications and training.

**Rohde & Schwarz Romania S.R.L.**

**Bd. Eroii Sanitari, nr. 89, Sector 5,**

**Tel / Fax: +40 21 411 20 13; +40 21 410 68 46**

**Email: [rs-romania@rohde-schwarz.com](mailto:rs-romania@rohde-schwarz.com)**

**[www.rohde-schwarz.com](http://www.rohde-schwarz.com)**



## About HARRIS Tactical Communications

Harris RF Communications is the leading global supplier of secure radio communications, tactical communication networks and embedded high-grade encryption solutions for military, public safety, government and commercial customers.

Tactical Communications serves the U.S. Department of Defense, international militaries and government agencies with a comprehensive line of secure radios and systems. The Falcon® family of software-defined tactical radio systems encompasses manpack, handheld and soldier-worn vehicular applications. Falcon III® is the next generation of radios supporting network-centric operations worldwide. The newest Falcon III radio – the AN/PRC-117G multiband manpack radio – is the only system that is bringing true wideband networking capabilities to the battlefield today. These systems, along with the Falcon III handheld and vehicular radios, give customers unprecedented situational awareness capabilities, including streaming video to the tactical edge of the battlefield.

Internationally, Harris Falcon radios form the foundation for high-performance system solutions that address comprehensive requirements in command and control, homeland security, disaster relief, narcotics interdiction and other applications. For instance, the new RF-7800S Secure Personal Radio acts as the hub in Falcon Fighter, a newly introduced soldier system.

We have received numerous testimonials from warfighters telling us Harris tactical radios are changing the way they conduct their missions, and are saving military and non-combatant lives on the borderless battlefield.

Underpinning the success of our Tactical Communications segment is its commercial business model, which fosters the agility to innovate and introduce new solutions faster than our competitors.

### Key Tactical Communications Products and Technologies

1. [Tactical Radios and Networking](#) o Falcon II interoperable, software-defined tactical radios o HF, VHF, UHF and multiband manpack, handheld, and vehicular radios o Falcon III multiband, multi-mission radios o Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Software Communications Architecture (SCA) - compliant multiband handheld and manpack radios and secure personal radios with wideband networking capability
2. Cryptographic Solutions o National Security Agency (NSA)-recognized leaders in [embedded encryption](#) o Sierra and Citadel cryptographic modules
3. High-Capacity Line of Site (HCLOS) Radio o Military and public safety applications of 802.16 based technology for high-speed IP data communications
4. [COMSEC \(Communications Security\) Terminals](#) o SecNet 54 o High-speed network encryption terminals o Blue Force Tracking Type 1 encryption device
5. Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance o Command and Control products o [Unmanned Aerial System \(UAS\) Intelligence Acquisition](#) o Border Security Systems
6. Integrated Communications Systems o Modular Soldier Systems o Integrated Vehicle Systems

## STAR OFFICE IMPEX SRL

RO 15576215

J40/9364/2003

[www.magazinuldebirotica.ro](http://www.magazinuldebirotica.ro)

0727 359 355

Bd. Basarabia, nr. 7, sector 2, București

# THE PARALLELISM<sup>1</sup> BETWEEN THE THEORY OF WAR AND THE THEORY OF PAINTING BASED ON CLAUSEWITZ ASSUMPTIONS

*Carola FREY*

Master student, National Defense University “Carol I”,  
freycarola@yahoo.com

**Abstract:** *This paper is a research on Clausewitz's view on the comparison between the study of war and the study of painting. However, it focuses also on the way in which, seen through this perspective, one can understand the artistic practices through the warfare experience and vice-versa. By analyzing the parallelism between the two concepts, with Clausewitz coordinates as guidelines, the fundamental features that are similar in terms of development and form can be drawn and examined. Thus, appealing to the theory of war, the theory of painting (and its product) is shown as possessing and exhibiting essential traits common to those of the art of warfare, needed and used by the practice of politics.*

**Keywords:** Clausewitz, theory of war, theory of painting, warfare and art, parallelism art – war.

## **Outlining the Framework**

Clausewitz resorts to the comparison between the study of war and the study of painting. From the start it must be stated that there is a fundamental difference between the theory of painting and painting as a product. This division allows for a double analysis: first painting seen and understood as a technique and as a process, and second painting as a tangible mean.

Regarding theory, both war and painting concern activities that demand specific technical expertise, but whose processes and outcome are not predictable and cannot be mechanically pursued<sup>2</sup>. Painting treatises do not help artists practice their art or gain a theoretical understanding. They only outline observations and concepts of permanent validity which can be used to construct personal theories and which can influence the application of certain ideas<sup>3</sup>. These considerations can be easily applied to the study of war. Theories aim to train and educate, to improve the ability to execute and respond, and enhance the quality of the particular practice. Clausewitz perversely denies many of the fundamental preconditions of theory as such – simplification, generalization and prediction, among others<sup>4</sup>. A common aspect that is found in the study of painting, often there is an artificially overlap of theory on the practice of painting. Simplification, generalization and prediction are all notions that cripple and restrict the understanding of this specific subject.

## **Theory of War and Painting – representations of the completeness of the three-dimensional world**

The study of painting and the study of war seen from Clausewitz's perspective include similar elements and theoretical considerations. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then in similar terms we can assume that art, and in special painting and

---

<sup>1</sup>Parallelism regarded as “similar in development or form”, The New Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Gramercy Books, New York, 1997, p. 484.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 190.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 187-194.

<sup>4</sup> Alan D. Beyerchen, *Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery*, [http:// www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/BeyerschenNonlinearity2.pdf](http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/BeyerschenNonlinearity2.pdf) [accessed on 08.01.2014], p. 2.

architecture, is also an instrument used by the political regime (politics). The ideology behind the political regime (that employs these means) is not only a series of theoretical assertion, but an aesthetic product with multidimensional matters. Furthermore, the conduct of war can be characterized to a particular political actor in terms of a series of images<sup>5</sup> (object specific of the study of painting). Thus, apart from painting as depicting the history of an epoch or as theory, its product represents war from a documentary perspective, as a form of information and political discourse. As an example we have the paintings<sup>6</sup> made in Clausewitz's period for the Napoleonic administration. Their essential problem as a propagandistic product of the political regime was to maintain the viewer's interest while carefully controlling public response to the never-ending warfare under the Empire<sup>7</sup>. From this perspective painting becomes a historical tool, which reveals war and the procedures behind it. Between the two a particular connection is made, not only as instruments used by a common source (painting and war seen as an expression of politics), but also as interdependent concepts - painting becomes a means of expression for war, while warfare provides subjects for art works. Nazism is a specific example of this. The racial and political theories of Nazism are not merely represented; they are constructed, embodied, made right there in your own sensorium<sup>8</sup>. The aesthetic expression of Nazism does not lie in their ideology; instead they build the ideology and political regime on it. Here painting becomes a concrete form of visual expression of the political will and character, as well as a strong form of propaganda.

The similarity of the two fields can be traced in terms of verisimilitude: both war and painting to an extent are crafts of fiction. Arising as instruments of the political realm, they have the characteristic to "use false instead of truth, knowing that it is false and that this is used in the place of truth"<sup>9</sup>. Fiction extended to war may be applied to the concepts of fog of war and friction<sup>10</sup> and can be set as an element in the planning process, due to the fact that war is the realm on uncertainty, with a volatile, complex and ambiguous character. Painting by fiction gives the impression that some figures are present and are set in different planes of reality, even though the artist knows that they are all on the same level. Fiction also sets the general form of the framework, the general imagine is mentally built and engineered before it becomes substance, by a chosen order, attitude, vision, etc.

The essential unpredictability of war obscures or distorts most of the factors on which action is based, and is reflected in art in an equal extent. There can be identified three nonlinear factors that form the concept of unpredictability in war according to Clausewitz. The first one is the interaction between entities that act, react and preempt. This is not a simple binary opposition (between action and reaction) since for Clausewitz what matters

---

<sup>5</sup>Drawing and painting enabled representations of war, it was also a method used to reproduce events in the press, until the development of photography.

<sup>6</sup>Philippe-Auguste Hennequin with the works *A Distribution of the Légion d'Honneur at the Boulogne camp (1806)*, *A Battle of the Pyramids (1806)* and *The Triumph of the French people on 10 August (1799)*; Jacques-Louis David with *The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame (1806)*; Antoine-Jean Gros with *Bonaparte Visits the Plague Stricken in Jaffa (1804)*.

<sup>7</sup>David O'Brien, *After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda*, 1 vol. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2006. Co-published by Gallimard  
<http://www.19thc-artworldwide.org/index.php/autumn07/118-after-the-revolution-antoine-jean-gros-painting-and-propaganda-by-david-obrien>, [accessed on 03.01.2014].

<sup>8</sup>Crispin Sartwell, *Art and Politics*, in American Society For Aesthetics, An Association for Aesthetics, Criticism and Theory of the Arts, Volume 30, Number 3 Winter 2010.  
<http://www.aesthetics-online.org/newsletter/30.3.pdf>, [accessed on 03.01.2014].

<sup>9</sup>Quintilian, *Arta oratorică*, vol. 1, BPT Minerva, Bucharest, p. 203.

<sup>10</sup>Friction - "will describe the effect of reality on ideas and intentions in war", Paret Peter, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 124.



takes place in between and around the interacting entities<sup>11</sup>. In painting these entities are represented by shape, color and expression, engaged in an interaction of tendencies. By this process a special dynamic is created, through which the visual effect is perceived as an end state result. The second factor that can generate unpredictability is “friction”. Clausewitz argues that wars are dissipative systems, which in the real world (as opposed to that of pure theory) always consume people and other limited resources. In another sense what he meant with this term was the amplification of a micro cause to a macro-consequence, in a kind of cascade of things gone wrong<sup>12</sup>. The correspondent can be found in the field of painting since a micro cause can affect in a large way the outcome of a painting. A single disproportionately line or a shadow placed in a different position or of a different intensity can create a chain effect that will sever the harmony of the final image, thus of the image as it was build in theory.

Clausewitz regards also the play of chance and probability as a source of unpredictability in war. These work at a similar extent in the theory of painting. Let us take for example color, as a theoretical basic element. By its very nature, as a physical phenomenon, with strong cultural connotations, color can transcend disciplinary boundaries. Thus, it can become the subject of chance and probability. What is generally associated with a particular color does not relate to the color in itself, but to the historical and cultural formation in which that argument is built, with special features suitable for certain groups.

Furthermore, if the conduct of war affects its character, the relationship between war and “Politik”, given Clausewitz understanding, is one that has a dynamic character. New tactics and technologies affect the way a war is fought. Plastic representation strategies and technological standards evolve and are shaped on the basis of technology and visions. Each period, both in painting<sup>13</sup> and warfare<sup>14</sup>, have their own character and means.

P01

“Genius”<sup>15</sup> in Clausewitz view is not a singular trait but a mixture of courage, intellect and strength of will and character. “Courage” as an element has two forms: an individual quality and a quality inspired by higher motivations or ambition. “Courage” defined in this manner can be applied to the artist. The individual quality is found at the core of the artistic view, while driven by high motivation and ambitions. These actively participate in the process of painting.

By “intellect” the sensitive sense of the military commander is brought out, which has to deal with imperfect intelligence, unforeseen circumstances, etc. It’s the way the commander manifests its abilities, capabilities and skills in the unpredictable background forged by war. The characteristic of “intellect” affects also the painter in his approach. The painter, such as the military commander, should free the “image” of the issue of mimesis. Constraints and ideological pressures of a realist approach must remain outside and ineffective of the demarche. From this element a complex technical matter emerges, with overlapping and cumulative patterns.

“Strength of character” targets the ability of the commander to maintain his balance and convictions, in spite of strong emotional pressures. Artists led by “strength of character” and will, along with their imagination or intellect, form either objects or concepts, which are released from their physical form. Strength of will shapes a technical complex, specific to a

<sup>11</sup> Alan D. Beyerchen, *Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery*, [http:// www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/BeyerschenNonlinearity2.pdf](http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/BeyerschenNonlinearity2.pdf) [accessed on 08.01.2014], p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Here it is referred to art movements, that have a specific tendency or style, with a specific common philosophy or goal, followed by a group of artists during a restricted period of time. As examples: Impressionism , Expressionism, Art Nouveau, Renaissance, Baroque, etc.

<sup>14</sup> Medieval warfare, industrial warfare, modern warfare, etc.

<sup>15</sup> See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and PeterParet, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, pp. 115-122.

particular artist. By this element the artist outlines his specific style, in spite of external pressures and artistic trends.

### **Conclusions**

The relationship between warfare and painting is always a dynamic one, intertwined and perceived by few. It is characterized mainly by the fact that both seek individual aspects while postulating general traits. Artists, both the ones that use the means of painting and the ones that use warfare, create the necessary context for these two subjects, and they form the environment for their art, no matter how sublime, devastating or destructive. It is art made by living artists.

### **Bibliography:**

1. Beyerchen, Alan D., *Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery*, available at, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/BeyerschenNonlinearity2.pdf>;
2. O'Brien, David, *After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda*, 1 vol. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2006. Co-published by Gallimard;
3. Paret, Peter, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976;
4. Quintilian, *Arta oratorică*, vol. 1, BPT Minerva, Bucharest;
5. Sartwell, Crispin, Art and Politics, in *American Society For Aesthetics, An Association for Aesthetics, Criticism and Theory of the Arts*, Volume 30, Number 3 Winter 2010, available at <http://www.aesthetics-online.org/newsletter/30.3.pdf>;
6. The New Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Gramercy Books, New York, 1997.