

**Opera suspicionată (OS)**  
**Suspicious work****Opera autentică (OA)**  
**Authentic work**

OS	Mang E., Mang I., "Determin large prime numbers to compute RSA system parameters", <i>Journal of Computer Science and Control Systems</i> , Vol.1, Nr. 1, p.54-57, 2008. Disponibil la: <a href="http://electroinf.uoradea.ro/reviste%20CSCS/documente/JCSCS_2008/JCSCS_2008_10_MangE_1.pdf">http://electroinf.uoradea.ro/reviste%20CSCS/documente/JCSCS_2008/JCSCS_2008_10_MangE_1.pdf</a>
OA	Beth, T., Gollmann, D., "Algorithm Engineering for Public Key Algorithms", <i>IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications</i> , Vol. 7. No 4, p.458-465, May 1989.

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# DETERMIN LARGE PRIME NUMBERS TO COMPUTE RSA SYSTEM PARAMETERS

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***Abstract*** – *Cryptography, the secret writing, is probably same old as writing itself and has applications in data security insurance. There are cryptosystems where the encipher algorithm can be public. These are public key algorithms. Research on public key algorithms has been concerned with security aspects. The results of this research have induced sufficient confidence to apply public key cryptography a larger scale. The most used and checked public key-based cryptosystem was find by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, so called RSA system. This paper shows the RSA algorithm. We have realised a program that is able to determine prime numbers with over 100 digits and compute RSA system parameters.*

***Keywords:*** *public-key algorithms, prime numbers, RSA algorithm.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Research on public key algorithms has been concerned mainly with security aspects. The results of this research have induced sufficient confidence to apply public key cryptography on a larger scale [4][5]. The ISO and CCITT have been discussing public key systems. As an example, take the CCITT directory authentication framework, which refers to a public key algorithm. ISDN can create new applications for public key algorithms if their implementations can meet requirements ranging from bit rate (from 64 Kbits/s up to 140 Mbits/s), to storage and chip area, to physical security.

Realizations of some of the most popular public key algorithms rely essentially on efficient exponentiation. In the RSA algorithm, encryption and decryption are performed by exponentiation modulo a large integer  $N$  [6]. Exponentiation will be decomposed into a square-and-multiply algorithm. In modular integer arithmetic, squaring is usually as difficult as multiplication. Hence, we will only deal with the second. Binary representation of numbers suggests using a shift-and-add algorithm for multiplication. Reduction modulo  $N$  is usually performed after each shift-and-add step. To perform addition efficiently, the propagation of carries has to be controlled. This can be done by carry-look-ahead techniques. Because of the area

required, this architecture cannot be extended to an arbitrary length of look-ahead. Alternatively, a redundant delayed-carry representation can be used. The carries have to be resolved only at the end of a multiplication. An alternative is Bucci's method, which takes multiplication itself as a primitive operation, and computes the modulus by a series of multiplications, and cuts off the last significant bits (lsb's).

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange system and the ElGamal public key system are both based on exponentiation in a finite field  $GF(q)$ . For  $q$  prime, the considerations for modular integer arithmetic's apply again. New aspects arise in the case  $q=2^n$ . Exponentiation in  $GF(2^n)$  will again be decomposed into a square-and-multiply algorithm [3]. In  $GF(2^n)$ , we have

$$(u+v)^2 = u^2 + v^2; \quad (1)$$

hence, squaring is a linear operation. Thus we can hope for more efficient squaring algorithms. Different basis representations will favor multiplication or squaring, respectively. Squaring in a polynomial basis is, in general as expensive as multiplication. The same holds for dual basis representations. In a normal basis, squaring becomes a cyclic shift and can be performed in a single clock cycle. This fact has been used in the design of the Massey-Omura multiplier. However, the circuit for multiplication will require, in general,  $O(n^2)$  gates and have a rather irregular structure, so that the choice of a suitable normal basis is of great importance.

## II. RSA

Implementation on 8-bit microprocessors, as used on chip cards (Hitachi 65901, SEEQ 72720/TMS-7000) or on circuits based on processors of the 68000 family, achieve about 10-700 bits/s (for a 512-bit RSA). Dedicated circuits built with standard techniques yield about 6800 bits/s (CYLINK Inc., RSA Inc.). This bit rate may be sufficient for authentication and signature schemes using the Fiat-Shamir protocol, which uses very few multiplications in ISDN, at least 64 Kbits/s has to be achieved, and ultimately, several megabits per second must be achieved for broadband ISDN.

In the first part of our paper, we will therefore present a variety of algorithms that can help to facilitate better performance. Several authors have announced chips, e.g., the CT 10018 microprocessor from Crypto-Technologies, or algorithms that can achieve ISDN data rates. Usually, efficient implementation of these algorithms will demand dedicated hardware architecture. Thus, we will establish a close connection between full custom VLSI design and the “mathematics” of these algorithms.

### A. The Algorithm

The public key algorithm most frequently referred to was proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978. It is based on modular exponentiation [1].

We start with a short description of the RSA algorithm. The private information of a user consists of two primes  $p$  and  $q$ . Security considerations suggest using two primes with up to 100 decimal digits. From this private information, the user computes the public key, consisting of the product  $N = p \cdot q$  and a number  $e > 1$  which is co-prime to  $p-1$  and  $q-1$ .

To transmit a message, the sender divides the message into blocks  $m_i$  where  $m_i$  are numbers in the interval  $[1, N-1]$ . To encipher (Fig. 2) a block  $m$ , the sender uses the public numbers  $N$  and  $e$  to form

$$m \rightarrow m^e \text{ mod } N \quad (2)$$




Fig. 1. Main module




Fig. 2. Encrypt module

The receiver knows the factors of  $N=p \cdot q$  and is thus able to compute in advance the deciphering key  $d$ ,

$$d [1, (p-1)(q-1)] \quad ( )$$

uniquely defined by

$$e \cdot d \equiv 1 \text{ mod } (p-1)(q-1) \quad (3)$$

Elementary number theory guarantees, for,

$$c^d \equiv m \pmod{N} \quad (4)$$




Fig.3. Decrypt module

The security of RSA depends on the difficulty of factoring “hard” large numbers. Most numbers can be factored easily, so the primes  $p$  and  $q$  have to be chosen carefully to give a “hard” number  $N$ . This proves to be not too difficult. On the other hand, it still seems impossible to factor hard numbers with 200 decimal digits, even using supercomputers or other advanced computer architectures. An important problem for the system implementation is to find some prime numbers with over 100 ciphers. We have written a program which is able to determine such prime numbers and to calculate the parameters of the RSA system. It should be noted that RSA or similar systems can be used to implement security services, including key management, encypherment, signatures, and authentication. The diagram block which describes the RSA algorithm is shown in figure 1, figure2 and figure 3.

### B. Exponentiation MOD N

All of the above applications require in one way or another algorithms for computing the modular exponentiation

$$m \rightarrow m^e \pmod{N} \quad (5)$$

At this point, we will make no further assumptions on the structure of  $N$  [3]. Exponentiation can be implemented by a square-and-multiply algorithm (Knuth). There are two ways this can be done. Starting from lsb of the exponent, we get

$$m^e = m^{e_0} (m^2)^{e_1} (m^4)^{e_2} \dots (m^{2^{n-1}})^{e_{n-1}} \quad (6)$$

( $n$  denotes the length of the binary representation of  $N$ ). Multiplying the intermediate result with  $(m^{2^k})^{e_k}$  and updating  $m^{2^k}$  to  $m^{2^{k+1}}$  can be done in parallel. Hence, we call this the parallel square-and-multiply algorithm. Starting from the most significant bit (msb) of the exponent, we get

$$m^e = (\dots((m^{e_{n-1}})^2 \cdot m^{e_{n-2}})^2 \dots m^{e_1})^2 \cdot m^{e_0} \quad (7)$$

The intermediate result has to be squared before it can be multiplied by  $m^{2^k}$ . Hence, we call this the serial square-and-multiply algorithm. We have now identified the two basic operations: “square mod  $N$ ” and “multiply mod  $N$ ”. These are fixed-point long-integer arithmetic operations. As  $N$  is odd, we can divide by 2 mod  $N$ . In a binary number representation, this is just a shift and possibly an addition. The product  $a \cdot b$  can thus be computed by

$$a \cdot b = \frac{(a+b)^2 - a^2 - b^2}{2} \quad (8)$$

using only addition and squaring. Hence, we assume that squaring is about as expensive as multiplication and examine only latter.

### C. Multiplication MOD N

Binary number representations suggest using a shift-and-add algorithm for multiplication.

$$a \cdot b = \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i 2^i \right] \cdot b = a_0 b + 2a_1 b + 4a_2 b + \dots + 2^{n-1} a_{n-1} b \quad (9)$$

has a structure similar to that of the parallel square-and-multiply algorithm. It is obvious how a serial shift-and-add algorithm could be defined. Multiplication by 2 MOD  $N$  comprises a shift and, when the result is larger than  $N$ , also an addition by  $-N$ . Addition MOD  $N$  is thus the essential basic operation in our decomposition of exponentiation

MOD  $N$ . The following topics will be addressed in the search for efficient multiplication algorithms [3].

- Control of the Carries: Simple carry-ripple adders would take too much time. This disadvantage has to be faced when implementing RSA on a standard microprocessor.
- Computation of Residues MOD  $N$ : Intermediate results need not be reduced MOD  $N$  after each step; some time can be gained by allowing some overflow and adding an appropriate multiple of  $-N$ . This gain in time has to be balanced against the additional space for storing the multiple of  $-N$ .
- Step-Width in Shift-and-Add: The factor  $a$  need not be processed bit by bit as suggested in the above shift-and-add algorithm. The time for multiplication may be reduced by dealing with substring of  $a$ , either of fixed or arbitrary length. Treating  $a$  as a sequence of runs of 0's and 1's is an example for the second case.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

In the previous paragraphs, several algorithms that give efficient RSA implementations have been explored. It has already been pointed out that the crucial points in these algorithms are: controlling the carries in the addition, processing multiplications faster than bit by bit, and not incurring too much additional hardware, so that ultimately a single-chip RSA with a reasonable key length and a ciphering rate exceeding 64 Kbits/s is possible.

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